The First Draft of My Outline

Thesis: Shifting American political ideals and Nixon’s and Kissinger’s compassionate realist approach enforced Sino-American rapprochement.

1. Definitions
   1. Similar terms
      1. 1.     Détente: A relaxing or easing, as of tension between rivals.
      2. 2.     Rapprochement: A reestablishing of cordial relations, as between two countries.
      3. 3.     Reconciliation: the ending of conflict or renewing of a friendly relationship between disputing people or groups
         1. All of these terms may be used interchangeably in this literature.
   2. Important figures and their roles
      1. 1.     Richard Nixon: President of the US
      2. 2.     Henry Kissinger: National Security Advisor; later secretary of State to the US
      3. 3.     William Rogers: Secretary of State to the US
      4. 4.     Mao Zedong: 1^st Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party
      5. 5.     Chou Enlai: 1^st Premier of the Chinese Communist Party
      6. 6.     Lin Biao: Vice Premier of the People’s Republic of China
      7. 7.     Chiang Kai-shek: Director-General of the Kuomintang (Taiwan)
2. Historical background information
   1. Chinese History:
      1. 1.     What does Chinese communism look like?
         1. “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics”
         2. Chinese communism and divergences from Soviet communism
      2. 2.     China’s involvement with Vietnam
         1. Helped Vietnam defeat the French
         2. Sino-Soviet Split
            1. Soviet support in Vietnam
            2. Encircling China
            3. Cambodia
   2. American History:
      1. 1.     McCarthyism
         1. Brief history
            1. Inspired by The Red Scare
            2. Espionage, the FBI, and accusations
            3. Widely supported
            4. Kent v. Dulles
         2. McCarthyism in 1969
            1. Still widely supported anti-communist sentiments
      2. 2.     Vietnam War
         1. Brief history: America’s involvement
            1. Involvement began in 1955, ended in 1975
            2. Fight for democracy; Cold War influenced; supporting South Vietnam
            3. American opinion

III.  Compassionate Realism and Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics by Hans Morgenthau

1. Hans Morgenthau
   1. 1.     Written in 1946
   2. 2.     Widely disregarded
   3. The “single cause”
      1. 1.     “Since what the [political leaders] are after the magic formula want is simple, rational, mechanical, and what they have to deal with is complicated, irrational, incalculable, they are compelled, in order to present at least the semblance of scientific solutions, to simplify the reality of international politics and to develop what one might call the ‘method of the single cause’” (Morgenthau, 95).
   4. The effect of reality
      1. 1.     “The liberal statesman cannot afford to follow [his single cause] without taking into account the existence of the political forces which determine the course of history. For, at least upon him, those forces exert their daily pressure” (Morgenthau, 104).
   5. The irrationality of scientific man
      1. 1.     “Modern faith in science is founded upon three misconceptions of rationalist philosophy: the misunderstanding of the nature of man; of the nature of the world, especially of the social world; and, finally, the nature of reason itself” (Morgenthau, 153).
   6. Ethics in International Relations
      1. 1.     “Political practice, in turn, takes the ethical evaluation of political action for granted. The actors on the political scene, however they may be guided by considerations of expediency, must pay their tribute to these standards by justifying their actions in ethical terms” (Morgenthau, 177).
      2. 2.     “Whoever wants to maintain moral innocence must forsake action all together” (Morgenthau, 189).
      3. 3.     “Pitting [the political leader’s] reason against the secrets of the universe and recoiling from the darkness of his own soul, he triumphantly detects the limits of nature and faces, hapless, the social forces which his own limitless desires have created. A giant Prometheus among the forces of the universe, he is but a straw on the waves of that ocean which is the social world. In his struggle with nature, he is like a god… without assurance of victory and with the odds against him, man persists in the struggle, a hero rather than a searcher for scientific truth” (Morgenthau, 223).

IV. Opening moves show a change in values; Nixon and Kissinger go against the grain.

1. China viewed Nixon and Lyndon Johnson as “jackals of the same lair.”
   1. 1.     Little communication between US and China prior to Nixon’s ascent to the presidency.
   2. “The one somewhat off-beat concept which seemed to be on [Nixon’s] mind involved our relationships with the Soviet Union and China. In his opinion we should ‘stop falling all over ourselves’ to improve our relationships with Russia since this would ‘make better relationships with China impossible.’” (Mann, 18). Directly against foreign policy.
   3. Nixon contacted Kissinger directly to start evaluating the stance on China.
   4. First contact was through Poland.
   5. Marshall Green (assistant secretary of state for East Asia), “The unsettling and potentially damaging impact on some of our friends and allies and their assessment of our China policy is substantial” (Mann, 24).
2. Kissinger visits China
   1. Avoiding William Rogers
      1. 1.     “In a sense, Rogers was not alone. By the time of Kissinger’s trip to China, many of America’s top leaders and its foreign policy institutions were intriguing against one another—including Nixon and Kissinger themselves” (Mann, 31).
   2. Sultan Muhammed Khan: “At the time, the Chinese were very depressed about Vietnam. They were worried about how long it would take for themselves to be involved in a war with the United States.” US and China used Bangladesh to communicate with one another.
   3. “I think Henry [Kissinger] used these [studies on China] largely as a dodge, to distract people while he was carrying his secret diplomacy” (James Lilly, 27).
   4. In Kissinger’s memoirs, Chou is portrayed considerably more warmly and positively than Nixon or any other American official. “Urbane, infinitely patient, extraordinarily intelligent…” (Kissinger, memo).
   5. Kissinger’s double and sneaking into China.
   6. “Taiwan was only briefly mentioned.

VI. More American Politics

1. “The decision by Nixon and Kissinger to pursue a new relationship with China faced a peculiar problem in Washington. Ever since 1949 all planning and policies regarding China were conditioned by the fact of Sino-American hostility… the McCarthy era showed what could happen to an individual within those hostile structures who might argue that our national interest within these hostile structures who might argue that national interest was not well served” (Schaller, 165).
2. “Important changes were taking place in the perceptions that Peking and Washington had of each other. Despite the new involvement in Cambodia and Laos, American ground troops were being gradually withdrawn from Vietnam… Meanwhile, China witnessed the ominous buildup of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces all along its northern border. The Chinese leadership saw this as a much more immediate threat to their nations security” (Schaller, 166).
3. “From the outset of the Nixon administration, the Democrats had been agitating for a change in China policy. Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the presidential rival Nixon feared most, had called for recognition of China at the United Nations and the removal of American troops from Taiwan” (Foot, 17-18).
4. Ping-pong diplomacy.
5. “Finally, in late April, Chou sent word… that he was willing to receive a Nixon emissary…. Nixon broke open a bottle of Courvoisier to celebrate” (Mann, 29).
6. “In late October [of 1970], during a news conference, Nixon made reference to the ‘People’s Republic of China.’ This marked the first time an American president had publicly used the real name of the Peking regime: implicitly it acknowledged the legal existence of that government” (168).
7. Nixon visits China
   1. Vietnam War during February of 1972
   2. Feb 21-28, 1972
8. Conclusion
   1. Was this an instance of compassionate realism?
      1. 1.     Yes! Look at their memoirs, the public opinion, and the opinion of officials.
   2. Long-term effects of Nixon’s trip (secured Sino-American ties “for the next 25 years”).
   3. “Only Nixon could go to China.”

 

Annotated Bibliography (Updated)

Annotated List of Works Cited

Thesis: Shifting American political ideals and Nixon’s and Kissinger’s compassionate realist approach enforced Sino-American rapprochement.

 

“Timeline: Nixon’s China Game.” American Experience: Nixon’s China Game. Public Broadcasting System, 1999. Web. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/timeline/timeline6.html&gt;.

This incredibly detailed timeline starts in June, 1945 and ends in April, 1979, and is associated with Nixon’s China Game, a documentary about Nixon visiting China. The timeline outlines each leaders’ political moves and correlates them to the exact date of the occurrence.

The level of detail provides evidence that Nixon and Kissinger were, on the American side, the driving factor behind Sino-American détente. Not only that, but the detail in which the timeline was made allows me to keep each moment in perspective to significant events in the Vietnam War, domestic events, and moments in détente.

Bell, Duncan. Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme. Oxford University Press, 2010.

Bell examines a variety of international relations theories. He unpacks Morgenthau’s interpretation of compassionate realism.

This was the least biased interpretation of Morgenthau’s theory of compassionate realism, which I will likely be using as a definition in my paper.

Cohen, Warren. America’s Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations. 1^st ed. Canada: John Wiley & Sons, 1971.

America’s Response to China is the standard text on Sino-American relations written by Warren Cohen, a diplomatic historian. The book analyzes trends, conceptions, and concerns from both Chinese and American points of views that have shaped Sino-American policy. This particular edition includes a chapter entitled, “The Response to Chinese Nationalism,” which examines societal American reactions to Chinese Communism in the Cold War era.

Because this is the standard on Sino-American relations, reading this gives me the background that is similar to most other Sino-American scholars. Furthermore, it provides an analytical juxtaposition American McCarthyism: Chinese nationalism. 

Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit Ally.’ United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

In Goh’s thesis, she claims that a historically sensitive constructivist approach explains why the United States would be willing to reconcile with China. She shifts the focus away from the power balance between US, Soviet Union, and China, and instead centers her support on the era’s political leadership and social changes.

Inadvertently, Goh provides a variety of analysis that proves compassionate realism was a heavy player in détente. In her introduction, she also provides a variety of material that the power play between Russia, the US, and China were widely insignificant to Nixon’s visit to China; ultimately, the decision was Nixon’s, Kissinger’s, Enlai’s, and Mao’s.

Hsiao, Gene. Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications. 2nd ed. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.

This compilation of academic writing and analysis gives a variety of viewpoints on Sino-American détente that was organized after The Asian Studies Program of Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville Conference. Historical context leading to Nixon’s visit to China is widely debated in each article. Furthermore, Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications also provides nine primary sources that directly note the personal interaction between the Chinese and US leadership in late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Some of the most important chapters include “American News Media and China,” “Moscow’s Reaction to Nixon’s Jaunt to Peking,” and  “A Future for Taiwan.”

The primary sources in this compilation provide a gateway into Nixon’s and Kissinger’s personalities, showing how their leadership, personal ambition, and arguably frivolous desires influenced foreign policy. They also prove that Nixon intentionally avoided the Senate and State Department (aside from Kissinger) in his decision to visit China.

Hsu, Chun-Ye. Sino-American Relations and Détente: Nixon, Kissinger, Mao and the One-China Policy, with special reference to Taiwan. School of International and Community Studies Design and Social Context Portfolio. RMIT. 2008.

This graduate student’s paper focuses on how Taiwan, the One-China policy, and human rights issues played a role in Sino-American reconciliation. He goes into depth in comparing Taiwanese nationalism and American nationalism, which signals why Nixon was willing to push Taiwan aside to reestablish contact with Mainland China.

Taiwan and human rights are major concerns for US constituencies; many argue that Nixon’s visit to China turned the United States’ back on both of these issues. This paper provides evidence that Taiwan had very little to do with Nixon’s decision to visit China.

Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton. 1st ed. New York: Vintage, 2000.

About Face was written by ex-Los Angeles Times reporter James Mann, who was newspaper’s bureau chief in Beijing from 1984 to 1987. His work translates a variety of primary sources into prose while trying to capture the personalities of the individuals involved with Sino-American détente.

Mann’s show of personality and wonderful application of primary sources proves that Kissinger in particular ignored hard realist influenced policy-making in favor of compassionate realism.

Nixon’s China Game: A Secret Diplomatic Breakthrough That Shocked and Changed the World. Alexandria, VA: PBS/WGBH, 1999. Video.

This is an elaborate documentary that follows Kissinger’s interaction with China to prepare for Nixon’s arrival. The video focuses on Kissinger’s compassion and devotion to reinstate formal Sino-American relations, while also providing commentary on shifting American social views from 1949 onward.

This film directly addresses how McCarthyism was a direct hindrance to Sino-American relations. As it dissipated, Nixon and Kissinger were allowed to move forward with their personal goals. The film also shows how the Vietnam War could have been a major player in reconciliation. However, because of Nixon and Kissinger’s compassionate realist approaches, the War did not prevent détente.

Schaller, Michael. The United States and China in the Twentieth Century. 1st. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1979.

Schaller focuses on Sino-American relations from 1930 on with an emphasis on how American leaders tried to impose on Chinese sovereignty. He goes into depth as to why America would want to “reshape Asia” because of domestic concerns and perceptions of its own needs.

This book looks at Sino-American relations and détente from a historically normative perspective, which is appositional to my thesis.

Scheuerman, William E. “Was Morgenthau a Realist? Revisiting Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics.” Constellations. 14.4 (2007): 506-530.

In this academic article, Scheuerman’s thesis is that Morgenthau was not a true realist. In listing various moments where Morgenthau invokes ethics into his theory. Scheuerman then concludes that Morgenthau is a moralist, citing and explaining compassionate realism as an example of Morgenthau’s liberalist approaches.

While reviewing Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics, Scheuerman summarizes Morgenthau’s theory about compassionate realism and tries to poke holes in it with realist theory. This helped me understand compassionate realism while also comparing it to opposing theories.

Vogel, Ezra., American Assembly. Living with China: U.S. China Relations in the Twenty-First Century. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.

Published a number of years after détente, this compilation looks at how 1970’s policy impacted Sino-American politics for decades after the event. The book is a compilation of academic works surrounding Sino-American relations, presented to The American Assembly in June, 1995. Important chapters include “Domestic Forces and Sino-US Relations,” “Breaking the Impasse over Human Rights,” and “A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the Global Order.”

Though there are only a few sections that directly relate to my thesis, the authors make specific references to McCarthyism, Chinese social problems of the 1970’s, and Enlai’s and Kissinger’s personal relationship. All of these factors help build the case that détente policy was mainly based in compassionate realism.

 

Annotated Bibliography… thus far!

I feel like I need to do a lot more research, but this is what I have as of now. Also, thank freaking God Agnes has interlibrary loan; without it I simply wouldn’t be able to write this paper!

Thesis: Shifting American political ideals and Nixon’s and Kissinger’s compassionate realist approach enforced Sino-American rapprochement.

“Timeline: Nixon’s China Game.” American Experience: Nixon’s China Game. Public Broadcasting System, 1999. Web. <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/china/timeline/timeline6.html&gt;.
This incredibly detailed timeline starts in June, 1945 and ends in April, 1979, and is associated with Nixon’s China Game, a documentary about Nixon visiting China. The timeline outlines each leaders’ political moves and correlates them to the exact date of the occurrence. The level of detail provides evidence that Nixon and Kissinger were, on the American side, the driving factor behind Sino-American Détente.

Bell, Duncan. Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme. Oxford University Press, 2010.
Bell examines a variety of international relations theories. He unpacks Morgenthau’s interpretation of compassionate realism.

Cohen, Warren. America’s Response to China: An Interpretative History of Sino-American Relations. 1^st ed. Canada: John Wiley & Sons, 1971.
America’s Response to China is the standard text on Sino-American relations written by Warren Cohen, a diplomatic historian. The book analyzes trends, conceptions, and concerns from both Chinese and American points of views that have shaped Sino-American policy. This particular edition includes a chapter entitled, “The Response to Chinese Nationalism,” which examines societal American reactions to Chinese Communism in the Cold War era.

Goh, Evelyn. Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961-1974: From ‘Red Menace’ to ‘Tacit Ally.” United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
In Goh’s thesis, she claims that a historically sensitive constructivist approach explains why the United States would be willing to reconcile with China. She shifts the focus away from the power balance between US, Soviet Union, and China, and instead centers her support on the era’s political leadership and social changes. She then concludes that Nixon’s new China policy is a product of compassionate realism.

Hsiao, Gene. Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications. 2nd ed. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.
This compilation of academic writing and analysis gives a variety of viewpoints on Sino-American Détente that was organized after The Asian Studies Program of Southern Illinois University at Edwardsville Conference. Historical context leading to Nixon’s visit to China is widely debated in each article. Furthermore, Sino-American Détente and Its Policy Implications also provides nine primary sources that directly note the personal interaction between the Chinese and US leadership in late 1960’s and early 1970’s. Some of the most important chapters include “American News Media and China,” “Moscow’s Reaction to Nixon’s Jaunt to Peking,” and  “A Future for Taiwan.”

Hsu, Chun-Ye. Sino-American Relations and Détente: Nixon, Kissinger, Mao and the One-China Policy, with special reference to Taiwan. School of International and Community Studies Design and Social Context Portfolio. RMIT. 2008.
This graduate student’s paper focuses on how Taiwan, the One-China policy, and human rights issues played a role in Sino-American reconciliation. He goes into depth in comparing Taiwanese nationalism and American nationalism, which signals why Nixon was willing to push Taiwan aside to reestablish contact with Mainland China.

Mann, James. About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship with China from Nixon to Clinton. 1st ed. New York: Vintage, 2000.
About Face was written by ex-Los Angeles Times reporter James Mann, who was newspaper’s bureau chief in Beijing from 1984 to 1987. His work translates a variety of primary sources into prose while trying to capture the personalities of the individuals involved with Sino-American Détente. In doing so, Mann indirectly proves that Kissinger in particular ignored hard realist influenced policy making in favor of compassionate realism.

Nixon’s China Game: A Secret Diplomatic Breakthrough That Shocked and Changed the World. Alexandria, VA: PBS/WGBH, 1999. Video.
An elaborate documentary that follows Kissinger’s interaction with China to prepare for Nixon’s arrival. The video focuses on Kissinger’s compassion and devotion to reinstate formal Sino-American relations, while also providing commentary on shifting American social views from 1949 onward. This film directly addresses how McCarthyism was a direct hindrance to Sino-American relations.

Schaller, Michael. The United States and China in the Twentieth Century. 1st. New York: Oxford University Press, USA, 1979.
Schaller focuses on Sino-American relations from 1930 on with an emphasis on how American leaders tried to impose on Chinese sovereignty. He goes into depth as to why America would want to “reshape Asia” because of domestic concerns and perceptions of its own needs. This book looks at Sino-American relations and Détente from a historically normative perspective.

Scheuerman, William E. “Was Morgenthau a Realist? Revisiting Scientific Man Vs. Power Politics.” Constellations. 14.4 (2007): 506-530
In this academic article, Scheuerman’s thesis is that Morgenthau was not a true realist. In listing various moments where Morgenthau invokes ethics into his theory. Scheuerman then concludes that Morgenthau is a moralist, citing and explaining compassionate realism as an example of Morgenthau’s liberalist approaches.

Vogel, Ezra., American Assembly. Living with China: U.S. China Relations in the Twenty-First Century. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1997.
Published a number of years after Détente, this compilation looks at how 1970’s policy impacted Sino-American politics for decades after the event. The book is a compilation of academic works surrounding Sino-American relations, presented to The American Assembly in June, 1995. Important chapters include “Domestic Forces and Sino-US Relations,” “Breaking the Impasse over Human Rights,” and “A Growing China in a Shrinking World: Beijing and the Global Order.”

 

The Writing Center’s Interpretation of an Annotated Bibliography

The Annotated Bibliography

Every research paper should contain a bibliography at the end to let the reader know what sources were used in the paper. Some instructors require annotated bibliographies either before or after the drafting of the paper. The following examples are in MLA style. As always, consult other style books for modification to the style approved by your instructor.

Why use an annotated bibliography?

An annotated bibliography is a useful tool for the reader and writer of a research paper. Perhaps your reader wants to know more about the subject of your paper but does not want to consult all of your sources. Perhaps one source contains information that you did not include in your paper but is still relevant to your topic.

What is an annotated bibliography and how is it written?

An annotated bibliography entry is written in the same format as a Works Cited entry, but also gives a brief summary of the information contained in the source and how helpful it was to your research. The summary is usually written in the present tense, and sentence fragments are permitted. Remember that annotated bibliographies allow you not only to cite your research but also to analyze it. Annotations do not have to be long, detailed critiques of every source; the typical annotation is usually no more than three or four sentences.

How is an annotated bibliography organized?

Usually sources are divided into categories—primary and secondary. A primary source is a first-hand account or “raw information.” Primary sources include notes from field studies, eyewitness accounts, interviews, newspaper articles, journals, diaries, etc. They are always listed first. Secondary sources include a scholar’s research on a particular topic or event, surveys, reviews, critiques, etc. They are written by people who are not directly involved with the event. The distinction between a primary and secondary source will depend on the nature of your paper.

The entries are arranged in alphabetical order. The annotations can begin on the same line as the citation or the line below.

Example

Works Cited

Primary

Blanchard, William, ed. Thoughts from the Gold Mines: Letters from miners during the California Gold Rush. New York: New House Press, 1996.
An extensive collection of letters from men who worked in the mines in California during the Gold Rush. Contains insight into the hardship experienced by families separated by the Gold Rush.

Secondary

Jones, Timothy. Eureka!: The Gold Rush in California. Atlanta, Georgia: University Press, 1995.
Explores the historical factors that led to the Gold Rush. Also looks at the rise and rapid decay of big boom towns founded during this era.

For more information on writing an annotated bibliography, see
The Chicago Manual of Style (14th ed): 514, 517, 520
The St. Martin’s Handbook (5th ed): 315-17
http://www.wisc.edu/writing/Handbook/AnnotatedBibliography.html
http://www.users.drew.edu/sjamieso/AnnotatedBibliographies.htm

NO. 8 IN THE WRITING CENTER HANDOUT SERIES

“Compassionate Realism”

Compassionate realism is “a formulation that makes capacious space for poetry (in the larger sense), classical political thought, history and commonsense… It is anti-theoretical and anti-metaphysical and insists on the need to draw ‘lessons’ from history and the concrete doings of men and women rather than to construct “models of human behaviour from which inferences are drawn” (Bell, 11).

Bell, Duncan. Political Thought and International Relations: Variations on a Realist Theme. Oxford Univ Pr, 2010.

The Working Thesis

 

“Shifting American political ideals and Nixon’s and Kissinger’s compassionate realist approach sparked Sino-American rapprochement.”

I intend to limit the scope of my paper from February 1, 1969 to the Shanghai Communique.

Notable quotables (and supporting evidence!) from The United States and China in the 20th Century, by Michael Schaller:

1. “Until 1969, few foreign policy experts in Washington were prepared to accept or understand China’s fear of being pinned between Soviet and American power” (164).
2. “The decision by Nixon and Kissinger to pursue a new relationship with China faced a peculiar problem in Washington. Ever since 1949 all planning and policies regarding China were conditioned by the fact of Sino-American hostility..the McCarthy era showed what could happen to an individual within those hostile structures who might argue that our national interest within these hostile structures who might argue that national interest was not well served” (165).
   

   Nixon, Mao, and Kissinger

3. “Important changes were taking place in the perceptions that Peking and Washington had of each other. Despite the new involvement in Cambodia and Laos, American ground troops were being gradually withdrawn from Vietnam… Meanwhile, CHina witnessed the ominous buildup of Soviet conventional and nuclear forces all along its northern border. The Chinese leadership saw this as a much more immediate threat to their nations security” (166).
4. “Soon after Nixon’s election, Peking suggested publicly that ‘peaceful coexistence’ should be pursued by America and China” (167).
5. “In late October [of 1970], during a news conference, Nixon made reference to the ‘People’s Republic of China.’ This marked the first time an American president had publicly used the real name of the Peking regime: implicitly it acknowledged the legal existence of that government” (168).
6. “Nixon’s initiatives toward Peking were made possible, in part, by a new mood in the United States. As informal contacts with China became more common, few Americans stood up to denounce the perfidy of dealing with ‘godless Red China'” (170).

A Timeline of Sino-American Relations from 1965-1969

Nixon visited in 1972, so this is pretty solid background information.

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
February 15		In a Communist Party journal, Beijing attacks the Soviet leadership as “revisionist,” in the first public indication of a Sino-Soviet split. (Themes)
March 2		United States and South Vietnam join in heaviest air strikes so far against North Vietnam.Six days later, the first U.S. combat troops arrive in South Vietnam.
March 15		Richard Nixon declares that the Vietnam conflict is a de facto war between the U.S. and China: “A United States defeat in Vietnam means a [Chinese] Communist victory.”
March 25		An article in the Beijing People’s Daily announces that China will “join the people of the whole world in sending all necessary material aid, including arms and other war materials” to South Vietnam, adding that China is ready to send “our own men whenever the South Vietnamese people want them, to fight together with the South Vietnamese people to annihilate the United States aggressors.”But most evidence indicated that Mao was preparing for a vast internal program, and was reluctant to become engaged in Vietnam.
April 2		Buildup of U.S. troops and aid in South Vietnam, and National Security Council decision to increase number and intensity of air strikes on North Vietnam.
April 9		Chinese and American jets clash over the South China Seas.
June 30		U.S. Agency for International Development announces the end of U.S. non-military aid to Nationalist China.The U.S. had given $1.5 billion in economic aid to Taiwan over the previous ten years. Military aid to the Nationalists would continue.
July 17		The Chinese Xinhua news agency reports that China will send “equipment, whole sets of installations, and supplies in the national defense and economics fields” to North Vietnam.The previous week, similar promises of aid were also made by the Soviet Union and North Korea.
July 28		President Johnson announces an increase in troops to Vietnam from the current 75,000 to 125,000.
November 10		China’s Cultural Revolution begins.
December 20		Premier Chou En-lai warns that if the U.S. decides on “going along the road of war expansion and having another trial of strength with the Chinese people,” China will “take up the challenge and fight to the end.”
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
March 8-30	Concerned that China might intervene in the widening Vietnam conflict, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee begins hearings on the need for a new policy toward mainland China.With virtually every major U.S. China scholar testifying, the near-unanimous opinion is that the U.S. should probably continue to “contain” China, but should also increase cultural, educational and technical contacts with the P.R.C..
March 20	At a monthly meeting in Warsaw, the U.S. reassures Chinese delegates that, despite its buildup in Vietnam, it has no plans to invade China.
April 10	In an effort to defuse Sino-U.S. tension, Premier Chou En-lai states that “China will not take the initiative to provoke war with the United States,” but cautions that China will support any government which “meets with aggression by the imperialists.”
April 12	U.S. stages first B-52 bomber raids over North Vietnam.
June 16	Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) calls for an “initiative for a direct contact between the Beijing government and our own government on the problem of peace in Vietnam and Southeast Asia.”
July 3	In a visit to Taiwan, Secretary of State Dean Rusk assures the Nationalist government regarding U.S. opposition to seating Communist China in the U.N., quelling fears that the U.S. is considering a more flexible policy toward the mainland.
July 12	In a nationally televised address, President Johnson calls for Sino-American reconciliation and states that the U.S. will try to reduce tensions between the two countries.
July 20	Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts) tells the Senate that both Communist and Nationalist China should be seated in the U.N.. At a news conference the next day, President Johnson says that while the administration would “do everything we can to increase our exchanges” with China, the U.S. would not adopt a “two-China” policy.
July 30	U.S. bombs the demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam for the first time.
October 20	The United Nations Association, an independent non-partisan organization dedicated to support of the U.N., urges that the United States adopt a “two-China” policy in the U.N. or run the risk that the General Assembly might seat the P.R.C. and oust the representative from Taiwan.
October 27	China announces that it has successfully conducted a guided missile-nuclear weapons test the day before.
November 10	The Washington Post reports a build-up of Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border.
November 21	The New York Times reports that in recent talks between Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the Soviets openly discussed Moscow’s growing concern over China’s nuclear capabilities, and the possibility of a nuclear confrontation growing out of increased tension along the Sino-Soviet border.
November 29	The U.N. General Assembly rejects a resolution to assign China’s U.N. seat to the Communists and expel the Nationalists.
December 7	The U.S. State Department announces the formation of a civilian panel to help “stimulate ideas” on U.S. China policy. The panel includes several China scholars who had criticized U.S. policy during the March 1966 Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on China.
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
January 15	Beijing radio announces a “new turning point” in the Cultural Revolution, urging all Mao’s supporters to “take political and economic authority into your own hands.”
January 15	The State Department issues “no comment” on reports that China had informed the U.S. the previous spring that it would stay out of the Vietnam War if the U.S. refrained from invading China or North Vietnam. Privately, other U.S. officials acknowledge that China had sent messages to the U.S. through several third-party channels.
January 25	The Xinhua news agency reports that “all of China is in a frenzy. . . . Only one word can describe the circumstances. That word is ‘anarchy.’ Without anarchy there can be no revolution!”
January 26	Chinese students clash with Russian soldiers in Moscow.
January 28	Chinese soldiers take part in enormous anti-Soviet demonstrations in Beijing.
January 28	The Chinese Army begins to intervene in numerous local struggles to stop fighting and maintain order, resulting in a virtual army takeover of China by the spring of 1968.
February 4	Moscow threatens retaliation if China does not stop vilifying the Soviet Union and harassing Soviet citizens in Beijing. The same day, Soviet diplomatic staff and families are evacuated from China.
February 11	U.S.S.R. and China terminate consular agreement.
April 25	Beijing radio reports that two American military aircraft have been shot down over southwestern China.American military spokesmen in Saigon report four planes missing, but deny that any U.S. planes had flown over China.
May 2	Beijing People’s Daily reports that the U.S. bombed the town of Ningming along the Vietnam border, which the U.S. denies.
May 10	President Johnson assures the visiting vice-president of Nationalist China that the U.S. will continue to defend Taiwan militarily and support Nationalist China in the U.N..
May 15	In a dispatch to the Chicago Daily News, reporter Simon Malley reports that Chinese Premier Chou En-lai had told him in a 2-1/2 hour interview that war between China and the U.S. is inevitable. The following day, the Xinhua News Agency denies that Chou had granted the interview, calling Malley’s dispatch “an out and out fabrication put out with ulterior motives.”
June 17	Communist China explodes its first hydrogen bomb.
June 25	The Xinhua news agency denounces meetings between President Johnson and Soviet Premier Kosygin in Glassboro, New Jersey, as “a global American-Soviet deal intended to enhance the anti-China, anti-Communist, anti-people and counter-revolutionary Washington-Moscow alliance.”
October 12	Secretary of State Rusk defends U.S. actions in Vietnam as a means of blocking Chinese expansion in Southeast Asia.
October	Writing in Foreign Affairs, presidential hopeful Richard Nixon declares that American policy “must come urgently to grips with the reality of China,” cautioning that “we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates, and threaten its neighbors.”
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
January 30	Communist forces in Vietnam launch the Tet Offensive, one of the major battles of the war, discrediting U.S. claims that the end of the war is near.
May 1	Governor Nelson Rockefeller of New York calls for more “contact and communication” with China in his campaign for the Republican presidential nomination.
May 2	U.S. Information Agency invites Chinese journalists to cover the 1968 presidential elections.
May 21	In separate speeches, two U.S. under secretaries of state urge China to accept U.S. offers of new contacts and exchanges.
July 12	Vice President Hubert Humphrey calls for an end to trade restrictions with China and a shift of U.S. policy away from “confrontation and containment” to one of “reconciliation and engagement.”
August 8	In his acceptance speech for the Republican presidential nomination, Richard Nixon says that he would “extend the hand of friendship to all peoples,” specifically, to the peoples of China and Russia.
August 21	U.S.S.R. invades Czechoslovakia. Two days later, Chou En-lai condemns the invasion as “the most barefaced and most typical specimen of fascist power politics played by the Soviet revisionist clique of renegades and scabs.”
November	In what becomes known as the “Brezhnev Doctrine,” Leonid Brezhnev defends the invasion of Czechoslovakiaby claiming that the U.S.S.R. has the right and duty to intervene in other Communist states to “protect” them from anti-Communist influences.
November 18	U.S. State Department announces that the Warsaw ambassadorial meeting between the U.S. and China — already postponed from May — would not take place because the Chinese had refused to name a date. On November 26, China denies it has caused the postponement, and proposes resumption of the talks in February, after the Nixon inauguration.The U.S. agrees to the proposal three days later.
December 10	In a televised interview, Arthur Goldberg, former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, states that he favors seating both China and Taiwan in the U.N..
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969
January 20	In his inaugural address, President Nixon hints at future changes in U.S. foreign policy: “After a period of confrontation, we are entering an era of negotiation.”
January 23	The Beijing People’s Daily carries an editorial denouncing Nixon as “an agent of the American monopoly groups which have now chosen him as their front man. It goes without saying that Nixon will pick up the line . . . pursuing the reactionary policies of oppressing and exploiting the American people at home and carrying out aggression and expansion abroad.”
January 27	In his first presidential news conference, President Nixon states, “Until some changes occur on their side . . . I see no immediate prospect of any change in our policy” toward China.
February	Nixon authorizes a secret bombing campaign of Cambodia. The bombing will continue for four years.
February 1	In a secret memo to his new national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, Nixon states, “I think we should give every encouragement to the attitude that this Administration is ‘exploring possibilities of raprochement [sic] with the Chinese.'” Kissinger calls for an internal re-examination of U.S. China policy.
February 18	China abruptly cancels Warsaw talks with the U.S., scheduled to re-open in two days.
March 2	Chinese border troops ambush a routine Russian patrol on the Ussuri River — part of the Sino-Soviet border — resulting in 38 deaths and 14 wounded. Soviet retaliation on March 15 causes heavy Chinese casualties. Altogether, there would be more than 400 skirmishes along the Sino-Soviet border in 1969.
March 3-7	Mass anti-Soviet demonstrations are held throughout China.
March 14	Soviet trade ministry officials report that as of March 2, China has halted all Soviet shipments to North Vietnam through Chinese territory.
March 21	Hong Kong newspaper The Star quotes Mao Tse-tung as saying that China is prepared to use nuclear weapons in the event ofa Soviet nuclear attack.
March 21-22	Senator Edward M. Kennedy calls for U.N. recognition of China, establishment of diplomatic relations with the P.R.C., and the removal of American troops from Taiwan.
April 21	Secretary of State William Rogers announces a new U.S. “two-Chinas” policy that accepts the existence of a Communist China on the mainland and a Nationalist China on Taiwan as “facts of life.” Despite the P.R.C.’s current hostility toward the U.S., Rogers says that “we shall take the initiative to reestablish more normal relations with Communist China and shall remain responsive to any indications of less hostile attitudes from their side.”
May 24	Chinese government issues an unprecedented public policy statement on the Sino-Soviet border dispute, opening the dispute to world opinion and marking a serious escalation of the Sino-Soviet split.
May 24	At Nixon’s request, Secretary of State Rogers asks Pakistani chief of state Yahya Khan to feel out the Chinese on expanded talks with the U.S.
June 8	Nixon announces the withdrawal of 25,000 troops from Vietnam. Two additional withdrawals follow later in the year, resulting in a 23 percent cut in U.S. forces in Vietnam.
July 21	U.S. State Department announces a slight easing of travel and trade restrictions on China.
July 25	In a complete reversal of U.S. East Asia policy now known as the Nixon Doctrine, President Nixon says that the United States would no longer act as the “global policeman,” and would reduce U.S. military presence in Asia and provide Asian countries with the means to defend themselves
August 1	President Nixon asks Pakistani chief of state Yahya Khan to secretly explore the possibilities for expanded talks between the U.S. and China. The next day, Nixon makes a similar request of Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu.
August 8	On tour in Asia, Secretary of State Rogers states U.S. willingness to resume diplomatic talks with China in Warsaw.
August 28	As Sino-Soviet border fighting continues, the U.S. State Department acknowledges reports that the Soviet Union is considering a preemptive strike against China’s nuclear installations.
September 23	China conducts its first underground nuclear test.
September	Nixon and Kissinger order U.S. Ambassador to Poland Walter Stoessel to contact his Chinese counterpart and ask to resume Warsaw talks.
October 20	China and the Soviet Union open border talks in Beijing.
November 7	U.S. quietly ends its 19-year patrol of the Taiwan Strait, which has become a symbol of U.S. commitment to Chiang Kai-shek.
December 3	Ambassador Stoessel makes contact with Chinese Charge d’Affaires Lei Yang and tells him that Nixon would like to open direct talks with the Chinese.
December 19	Ending a ban in place since 1950, the U.S. announces that subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. firms abroad will be allowed to buy and sell non-strategic goods with China.

 

Topic Discovered! Thesis: In Progress.

I RSS feed subscribed to everyone, which basically means that if someone breathes beyond the 52 posts already posted, I WILL KNOW ABOUT IT. Thank god for Google Reader.

It seems like everyone was keen on my first topic idea. There are many themes of reconciliation that can easily be traced when we look at 1960’s and 1970’s leadership in both US and China, so that should be interesting and (hopefully) easy to talk about. I have no idea what my thesis is going to be yet though. Oh, I know how to solve this problem! Start researching!

Some books that I plan on using include:

About Face by James Mann

America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations by Warren Cohen

Mao's China and the Cold War by Chen Jian

Sino-American Reconciliation Topic Ideas

It will come as little surprise that I will focus my topic on Sino-US relations… though I’m not sure what yet exactly. Ideas!

Idea 1

How did America and China reestablish contact after China closed its borders? Why is it that “only Nixon could go to China?” How did differences in governmental structures impact reconciliation?

Idea 2

I would like to look at the trilateral balance between US, China, and Taiwan during the Reagan administration.

Idea 3

In 2000, Clinton established Permanent Normal Trade Relations with the People’s Republic of China, thus deepening the ties between China and America, and also granting China admission to the WTO. Has this decision helped or hindered reconciliation?

Week 3: Discussion Questions

1. “Even once the curtain is drawn and the reality is revealed, perpetrators across the globe have an uncanny way of deflecting responsibility. Some still don’t understand, even after the world has changed around them, that what they did was wrong” (Sarkin, 72). How can we address cultural relativity in such absolute terms? Whose reality should the government trust? At what point should an apology be accepted? What about the people who need a lifetime to recover from PTSS?
2. What is “genuine repentance” (Sarkin, 73)? What about “true reconciliation” (Sarkin, 74)?
3. How effective is propaganda in trying to heal a community?  How is public education different than brainwashing? (Sarkin, 112)
   

   "Reconciliation" by Ellen Lindner

4. “A visit to central Africa by US President Clinton also prompted acknowledgement of America’s role in the slave trade” (Sarkin, 118). Does the US still need to reconcile with and compensate African nations for impeding their development and prosperity through the slave trade? Is there a time limit on reconciliation?
5. What language is appropriate when talking about reconciliation? “Justice or equality or liberty?” (Sarkin, 124) How does language, the connotation and the use of absolute terms impact the effectiveness of healing?
6. Holocaust trials and reconciliation are used frequently in our reading. One common debate is whether or not one can be held accountable if one doesn’t understand that what one did was wrong. As discussed on page 159 of Reconciliation in Divided Societies, how can a society heal if the moral monsters are unwilling to acknowledge their own crimes? What about those who were “inwardly opposed” to what happened, but failed to act? Who needs to ask for forgiveness?
7. What is the difference between ubuntu and reconciliation? How are they related? How are they different? What about “peace building” and reconciliation? What is “post-conflict justice?”
8. Can self, or even societal deception (as described in Govier’s article) be beneficial to reconciliation?
9. When does “human psychology… determine whether reconciliation is morally required?” (Dwyer, 95) Aren’t moral requirements dealt with in absolutes? “Reconciliation is not something we seek for its own sake” (Dwyer, 96). Why not? What does this statement mean? Why does the motive of reconciliation matter?
10. When addressing community reconciliation, is it more productive for individuals to heal first and then the group, or vice versa? Should approaches to post-conflict justice and reconciliation be determined globally,
    nationally, or locally?
11. How does the balance of power and wealth impact reconciliation?